

The Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine

The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Society in Austrian Galicia

John-Paul Himka



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in Austrian Galicia***

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The Ukrainian Studies Fund, Inc. was established in 1957. Its purpose is to raise funds for the establishment and support of Ukrainian scholarly centers at American universities. The organization has endowed three chairs in Ukrainian studies (history, literature, and linguistics) at Harvard University, and is in the process of completing the endowment of Harvard's Ukrainian Research Institute.

The Friends of HURI was established by a group of young professionals concerned about the cultural development of Ukraine and committed to the advancement of Ukrainian scholarship. The founding principle of this organization was two-fold: to seek financial support for HURI in the Ukrainian community and to draw the community into the academic and social life of Harvard University.

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FOREWORD

On the occasion of the Millennium of Christianity in Rus'-Ukraine, the Ukrainian Studies Fund in conjunction with the Friends of the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute has initiated the Millennium Series of seminal studies on historical and religious topics. The purpose of the Millennium Series is two-fold. First, although the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches are true successors to the Church formed in Kievan Rus' in 988, the Soviet state and the Russian Orthodox Church are attempting to portray the Millennium as the thousandth anniversary of the Russian nation and of Russian Orthodoxy. Therefore it is vital that the West be informed about the religious history and culture of Kievan Rus' from the Ukrainian perspective. Second, Ukrainians themselves may not be aware of the wealth of recent scholarly work on topics relating to Ukraine's rich cultural and religious legacy. Therefore, it is important to make readily available to all the heirs of Ukrainian Christian culture a basis for re-examining their spiritual roots.

One of the most important events in Ukrainian religious history was the Union of Brest of 1596, by which a segment of Ukrainian believers in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth united with the Roman Catholic Church. The partitions of Poland brought a very different fate to the Uniate Church in different regions of Ukraine. In the Romanov Empire, it was persecuted and destroyed by a government which espoused Russian Orthodoxy. In the Habsburg Empire, it was renamed the Greek Catholic Church and made the equal of the Roman Catholic Church. From 1772 to the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, the Greek Catholic Church had an important place in the Empire's religious and political affairs. Within the province of Galicia, it functioned as the major institution of the Ruthenians (as Ukrainians were known at that time). The Church played a great role in the national awakening of the Ukrainian masses and in shaping the national movement. In two essays, "The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-Building, 1772-1918" and "Priests and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian National Movement in Austria, 1867-1900", Professor John-Paul Himka examines the multifaceted relationship of the Church and Ukrainian society. In doing so, he analyzes one of the closest relationships between Church and national movement in the complex and vast Habsburg Empire.

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Ukrainian Studies Fund

The Greek Catholic Church and Nation-Building in Galicia, 1772-1918*

JOHN-PAUL HIMKA

Perhaps in no process of nation-building did the institution of the church play as great a role as in that of the Ukrainians of Austrian Galicia. This essay examines that role in terms of its impact on both the nation and on the church itself. The Greek Catholic church of Galicia was forged largely by the Josephine enlightenment; indirectly, then, this essay also looks at the role of the Habsburg dynasty in nation-building. It is one of the characteristic ironies of Ukrainian history that two institutions which have generally been regarded as backward-looking—the Habsburg dynasty and the Catholic church—moved the development of the nation so far forward.

This essay touches on six topics: (1) the church and the Habsburgs, (2) the church and education, (3) the church's role in shaping the national identity, (4) the place of churchmen and church institutions in the Ukrainian national movement, (5) the church and the secular intelligentsia, and (6) the church and the peasantry. So broad a range of topics requires restriction to the highlights and, inevitably, the simplification of complex historical moments. The compensation for these limitations, however, should be a sharper outline of the main contours of the subject at hand.

THE HABSBURG CHURCH

The principal reason why a group of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops entered into union with Rome in the late sixteenth century was to raise the status of their church within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This goal was never achieved. When the Habsburgs acquired Galicia in 1772, the Ukrainian church was a degraded

* I thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for awarding me a grant to research this subject in greater depth.

institution, reflecting decades of covert and overt discrimination. It was still referred to then as the Uniate or Greek Uniate church, a constant reminder that it had long been in schism from the True Church of Rome and had embraced union only within the recent historical past.¹ The term "Uniate" implied a certain inferiority vis-à-vis the real "Roman Catholics"² with whom these former schismatics were now united. This implicit inferiority was sanctioned by ecclesiastical law, which made it easier for a Uniate to become a Roman than vice-versa,³ as though it were proper for the superior rite to flourish at the other's expense. Socially, as well, the Uniate church was inferior to the Roman Catholic. Almost all nobles and burghers in Galicia's larger cities were Roman Catholics (or in the case of some burghers, Jews); almost all Uniates were serfs. Although the Uniate clergy was not, in theory, enserfed, some priests were in practice forced to pay rent to their lords, including labor rents; sons of priests who did not follow their fathers' calling were legally liable to the same feudal obligations as hereditary serfs. For the most part, Uniate priests had no formal seminary training; bishops were satisfied if candidates for the priesthood could recite the liturgy and demonstrate familiarity with the main doctrines of the faith. In the Uniate church wealth and education were the guarded privileges of a thin stratum of Basilian monks,⁴ who monopolized ecclesiastical offices and richer benefices and cut themselves off from the great mass of clergy and faithful. The church's internal weakness was exacerbated by the partitions of Poland, which left the Uniate metropolitan see under hostile

¹ The first union with Rome had occurred in 1439 at Florence, but was stillborn. The Uniate church generally traces its origins to the union of Brest, 1595-96, but Galicia itself remained a stronghold of Orthodoxy until Bishop Iosyf Shumlians'kyi openly embraced the union in 1700.

² Today the term *Roman Catholic* generally applies to the whole of the Catholic church irrespective of rite. However, in the Commonwealth and imperial Austria, *Roman Catholic* was reserved for the Catholics of the Latin rite.

³ The critical legislation was the constitution "Etsi pastoralis" of 1742. Pope Benedict XIV issued it to regulate the ecclesiastical life of the Greek and Albanian diaspora in Italy, which had adopted the Catholic faith while retaining the Byzantine rite (the so-called Italo-graeci). For an excellent historical survey of the problem of change of rite, see Anton Korczok, *Die griechisch-katholische Kirche in Galizien*, Osteuropa-Institut in Breslau, Quellen und Studien, 5-te Abteilung: *Religionswissenschaft*, 1. Heft (Leipzig and Berlin, 1921), pp. 85-105.

⁴ Catholics of the Latin rite (i.e., Poles) could join the Basilian order; this was the single case in which transfer to the Greek rite was as easy as transfer to the Latin rite.

tsarist rule and three diocesan sees that had jurisdiction over parishes in Austria.

The Habsburg emperors, particular Maria Theresa and Joseph II, introduced radical improvement in the affairs of the Uniate church. They were motivated by Enlightenment conceptions as much as by a desire to restore order in the spoils of Poland, partitioned allegedly on account of disorder, and to curb the restless Polish nobility, whose victim the Uniate church had ultimately been.⁵ Their reform was thorough. In June 1774 Maria Theresa announced her intention "to do away with everything that might make the Uniate people believe they are regarded as worse than the Roman Catholics."⁶ In the next month she decreed that henceforth the term *Uniate* was to be banished from private as well as public usage and replaced by the term *Greek Catholic*. Joseph II curbed the Basilian order by claiming as the imperial prerogative the right to appoint bishops from either the black or white clergy and by subordinating the Basilian monks to the Greek Catholic hierarchy (1781).⁷ He also took measures to improve the economic status of the parish clergy. Crucial educational institutions were established by the Habsburgs: the seminary for Greek Catholics attached to St. Barbara's Church in Vienna (the so-called Barbareum), founded in 1774 and replaced by a general seminary in Lviv in 1783,⁸ and the imperial seminary residence (*Convict*) for Greek Catholics, founded in Vienna in 1803.⁹ The culmination of the Austrian reforms was the reestablishment, in 1808, of the Galician metropolitan see.

Understandably, the leadership of the Greek Catholic church that emerged after the first decades of Habsburg rule had a loyalty to the Austrian state that went well beyond a formal compliance with legitimate authority; also understandably, it had an antipathy to the period of Polish rule, which had brought the Uniate church to the

⁵ The Habsburgs had already dealt with Uniates in the Hungarian territories of Transylvania and Subcarpathia. The most decisive steps to elevate the status of Uniates, however, were taken only after the acquisition of Galicia.

⁶ Cited in Julian Pelesz, *Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, 2 vols. (Würzburg and Vienna, 1881), 2:623-24.

⁷ A general antipathy to monastic orders was characteristic of Josephinism. Fritz Valjavec, *Der Josephinismus: Zur geistigen Entwicklung Österreichs im achtzehnten und neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, 2nd ed., rev. (Munich, 1945), p. 62.

⁸ The Barbareum was actually closed in the following year, 1784.

⁹ For the impact of Joseph II's reforms in clerical education on the East European peoples of the empire, see Valjavec, *Der Josephinismus*, pp. 118-19, 159.

unhealthy state in which the Habsburgs had found it. The political implications of these attitudes were already visible in 1809, when pro-Napoleonic Polish insurgents temporarily seized control of Lviv. The revolutionary Poles ordered the Greek Catholic metropolitan, Anton Anhelovych (1808–1814), to have the priests of his rite substitute Napoleon's name in the liturgy for that of Francis I. Anhelovych refused to break his oath of loyalty and fled the city, abandoning the metropolitan residence to plunder by the insurgents. He was soon captured by the Poles, who imprisoned him until Austrian troops pacified Galicia. For his loyalty Anhelovych was decorated by the emperor with the cross of Leopold.¹⁰

For the rest of the nineteenth century, the Greek Catholic hierarchy was to remain firmly supportive of the Habsburgs and decisively opposed to the Polish revolutionary movement. During the 1848 revolution, the Ukrainians of Galicia rallied under the Greek Catholic hierarchy to support the emperor and oppose the aspirations of the Poles and the revolutionary camp as a whole. Although the basis for this counter-revolutionary conduct lay in the social and national contradictions of the 1848 revolution itself,¹¹ rather than in an ideological imposition from the pulpit, the Greek Catholic leadership was able to articulate a pro-Habsburg policy on behalf of the larger Ukrainian society. In some measure, at least, the Greek Catholic church was responsible for imbuing Ukrainians in Galicia with the political consciousness that long earned them the epithet "Tyrolians of the East."

ENLIGHTENMENT: THE OTHER SIDE OF AUSTRIANISM

Loyalty to the dynasty was not all that the Greek Catholic clergy learned from Vienna. The Habsburgs, especially Joseph II, saw the role of the clergy as promoters of secular enlightenment;¹² that conception struck deep roots in the newly reborn (and grateful) Greek

¹⁰ Anhelovych was accompanied in flight by his vicar general, Mykhailo Harasevych (Michaelus Harasiewicz), to whom Francis I afterwards granted the title Baron of Neustern. Harasevych has left an account of the events of 1809 in his *Annales Ecclesiae Ruthenae*. . . (Lviv, 1861), pp. 919–32.

¹¹ For an excellent analysis of the Ukrainians' alignment in the 1848 revolution, see Roman Rosdolsky, *Zur nationalen Frage: Friedrich Engels und das Problem der "geschichtslosen" Völker* (Berlin, 1979).

¹² Valjavec, *Der Josephinismus*, p. 63; Eduard Winter, *Der Josefismus: Die Geschichte des österreichischen Reform-katholizismus 1740–1848* (Berlin, 1962), pp. 123–34.

Catholic church.¹³ The enlightened monarchs had not only established the institutions that revitalized the Greek Catholic church, but had implanted an ideal code of behavior in Greek Catholic clergymen that admitted no contradiction, or even strong distinction, between the propagation of the faith and of secular knowledge, between the nurture of good Christians and of good citizens.

A clergyman who exemplified the ideal was Ivan Snihurs'kyi.¹⁴ He imbibed the modern conception of the church's duties at the source—Vienna. He studied there from 1804 to 1808, assisted at St. Barbara's Church from 1808 until his appointment as pastor in 1813, joined the theology faculty at the University of Vienna in 1816, and became dean of the faculty in the following year. As bishop of Peremyshl' (Przemysl) in Galicia (1818–1847), Snihurs'kyi promoted learning at all levels. One of his first acts as bishop was to found a teachers' college (Institute for Cantors and School Teachers, 1818). He generously distributed stipends for Ukrainian students aspiring to church as well as state service. Against the almost unanimous opposition of the Polish nobility, he argued in the Galician diet (1840) for expanding the elementary school system in the Ukrainian countryside.¹⁵ He established a diocesan seminary in Peremyshl' for fourth-year theology students (1845), and when he died in 1847, his will left a fortune for educational purposes. Snihurs'kyi had also been an energetic patron of literary undertakings: he materially and morally supported the first group of Ukrainian writers to appear in Galicia, the so-called "Ruthenian Triad" (*Rus'ka triitsia*). He also established a diocesan printing press in 1829, which published some important works, including Markiiian Shashkevych's *Azbuka i abetsadlo* (1836).¹⁶ In short, Snihurs'kyi was not only a product of the Habsburgs' reform of Greek Catholic intellectual life, but also its devoted promoter and continuator.

¹³ See the strong endorsement of Joseph II's policies in a mid-nineteenth century Greek Catholic sermon: Iulian Hankevych, *Sluchainyi propovidy* (Lviv, 1877), pp. 212–14; for other sermons honoring the Habsburgs, see pp. 211–19, 230.

¹⁴ Iustyn Zhelekhovs'kyi, *Ioann Snihurskii: Eho zhyzn' i diiatel'nost' v Halyskoi Rusi* (Lviv, 1894); Pelesz, *Geschichte der Union*, 2:952–64.

¹⁵ S.B., "O prawach wlościan w Galicyi," *Biblioteka Warszawska*, 1843, no. 4, p. 134.

¹⁶ Jan Kozik, *Ukraiński ruch narodowy w Galicji w latach 1830–1848* (Craşov, 1973), pp. 90, 112, 115.

Although exceptionally talented and active, Snihurs'kyi was not alone in his campaign to spread enlightenment among the Ukrainians in Galicia. A much more limited personality, the metropolitan Mykhailo Levyts'kyi (1818–1858) was nonetheless concerned enough about education to revive parish schools, with cantors as instructors; between 1842 and 1856 about a thousand such rudimentary schools were established in the Lviv eparchy.¹⁷ Characteristic of the mentality of Greek Catholic episcopal enlighteners was a regulation Levyts'kyi issued for his seminarians in 1831: it made attendance at agronomy classes compulsory, because pastors would be expected to introduce their parishioners to better farming techniques.¹⁸

The lower clergy also came to accept the idea that their duties were more than religious. In 1848 (by which time most Greek Catholic priests had a university education) pastors were actively boosting the first Ukrainian newspaper, *Zoria halyts'ka*, in their parishes; priests received it from their deaneries and either read it aloud to the peasants themselves or had their cantors do so.¹⁹ In the 1860s priest-enlighteners rose to prominence, men like Ivan Naumovych and Stepan Kachala who wrote for the peasantry and established reading clubs (*chytal'ni*) and cooperatives in the villages. From then on, the fostering of village organizations and popular education became an essential component of pastoral activity. Educational themes were to be found in printed sermon collections.²⁰ This educational activism, of course, had a profound influence on Ukrainian society. The achievements of Ukrainians under Austrian rule in the spheres of both social and national

¹⁷ Jan Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją. Studia z dziejów ukraińskiego ruchu narodowego w Galicji w latach 1848–1849*, Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 381, Prace Historyczne, 52 (Cracow, 1975), p. 149.

¹⁸ Priests were themselves gentlemen farmers, and Levyts'kyi's regulation was intended to improve both their own and their parishioners' agriculture: ". . . non tantum suam rem oeconomiam majori cum prosperitate gerere, sed etiam parochianis agriculturam exercentibus jam exemplo, jam consilio plurimum prodesse poterunt." Kurylo Studyns'kyi, *L'vivs'ka dukhovna seminarija v chasakh Markiiiana Shashkevycha (1829–1843)*, Zbirnyk fil'ol'ogichnoi sektsyi Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka, 17–18 (Lviv, 1916), pp. xxxviii and 64. Levyts'kyi's regulation was completely in accord with Joseph II's intention that pastors study agriculture and animal husbandry. Winter, *Der Josefismus*, p. 126.

¹⁹ Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją*, p. 53.

²⁰ Hankevych, *Sluchainyi propovidy*, pp. 88–97; Antin Dobrians'kyi, *Nauky tserkovny na vsi prazdnky v rotsi dlia zhytelei sel'skykh*, 2nd ed. (Peremyshl', 1894), p. 224.

liberation would have been unthinkable without the cultural advancement fostered by a large army of priest-enlighteners.

The experience of the Austrian enlightenment left the Greek Catholic church with a service-oriented clergy as its greatest legacy. But the Josephine spirit seems to have been manifest in more subtle forms as well, such as the Greek Catholic clergy's attitude towards the local Jewish population. While Orthodox priests immediately across the Russian border in the Right-Bank Ukraine remained steeped in a superstitious prejudice against Jews, and while by the end of the nineteenth century Roman Catholic priests in Western (Polish) Galicia adopted a more modern version of anti-Semitism, the Greek Catholic clergy of Galicia did not promote religious or racial anti-Semitism.²¹ When, in the course of building the national movement in the village, Greek Catholic priests did agitate against Jews, their agitation remained on the socioeconomic and political plane: priests opposed taverns, which Jews ran; they opposed private money-lending, in which Jews predominated, and encouraged the peasants to form credit unions instead; they urged Ukrainian peasants to gain a foothold in commerce, particularly to organize cooperative stores, which brought them into conflict with Jewish merchants; and they supported Ukrainian candidates to par-

²¹ I have dealt with the insignificant role of the clergy and religion in Jewish-Ukrainian conflict in "Ukrainian-Jewish Antagonism in the Galician Countryside during the Late Nineteenth Century," in *Jewish-Ukrainian Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton, forthcoming). I have not been able to find a single work written by a Greek Catholic priest in the period under consideration which reflects either traditional Christian prejudices against Jews or the influence of the modern anti-Semitic movement that emerged in Austria in the late nineteenth century. One such work may be Lev Dzhulyns'kyi's *Talmud, abo nauka o zhydivskii viri* (1874), quite possibly a popularization of August Rohling's *Der Talmudjude*. Searches in the academy and university libraries in Lviv and in the national library in Vienna have failed to turn up a copy of this pamphlet. Jews did not fare badly in Greek Catholic homiletic literature. In Hankevych's four sermons on Christ's passion, there is not a single reference to Jews: *Sluchainyi propovidy*, pp. 147-65. In his sermons for Good Friday there is also no mention of Jews. Iulian Hankevych, *Prazdnychnyi propovidy*, 2 vols. (Lviv, 1876), 1:83-91. See also his sermons at the baptism of Jewish converts: *Sluchainyi propovidy*, pp. 36-40. Dobrians'kyi's sermon for Good Friday does contain one sentence saying that the Jews nailed Christ to the cross; this is in an account of how much Christ suffered, not in an account of who did what during the passion. *Nauky tserkovnyi*, p. 66. Dobrians'kyi's sermons contain a few other religiously motivated, negative references to the Jews (pp. 88, 108, 282); these are all short remarks in passing. One other allusion is to the role of the Jewish tavern-keeper (p. 203).

liament and diet, whereas Jews were involved in electoral agitation for Polish candidates.²²

The attitude of the Greek Catholic clergy toward the Jews was in fact very reminiscent of that of Joseph II, who promulgated religious toleration but took measures to counteract what he considered the negative economic role of Galician Jews and to insure their conformity to the state idea²³ (as the Ukrainians wanted them to conform to their national idea). This is not the place to judge the policies of either Joseph II or the Greek Catholic clergy toward Jews; I only wish to call attention to their similarity, which may be an indication of how formative the enlightenment period was for the Greek Catholic church.

THE NATIONAL IDENTITY OF GREEK CATHOLICS

The Greek Catholic church was not decisive in determining national identity in Ukrainian Galicia, but it did contribute to both the exacerbation and the resolution of the identity crisis of the nineteenth century. Galicia's Ukrainians entered the age of nationalism unsure as to where they fit in the East European mosaic of nations. Centuries of serfdom and enforced ignorance had not allowed a sense of national identity to crystallize. Some Ukrainians thought they were a branch of the Poles; others that they were Russians; still others that they were the unique, but small nation of Ruthenians or Rusyns,²⁴ whose territory extended only over Galicia, Bukovyna, and Subcarpathia; and, of course, still others recognized national kinship not only with the other Ruthenians of Austria, but also with Ukrainian people across the Russian border.²⁵ At

²² For examples of priests coming into conflict with Jews in the villages, see *Bat'kivshchyna*, 1884, no. 26, p. 157, and 1885, no. 46, p. 318 (over the establishment of Ukrainian stores); 1884, no. 23, p. 138 (over the tavern); 1885, no. 46, p. 318 (over a credit union and communal granary); 1884, no. 20, p. 118 (over economic exploitation in general).

²³ See Raphael Mahler, *A History of Modern Jewry, 1780-1815* (New York, 1971), pp. 330-33.

²⁴ *Rusyny* (German: *Ruthenian*) was the historical name of the Ukrainians of the Habsburg empire. In nineteenth-century usage, the term *ukraintsi* was reserved for Ukrainians in the Russian Empire. When I refer to "Ukrainians" in Galicia before 1900, I am in fact deferring to a terminological anachronism which has, however, gained wide acceptance among historians of Galicia.

²⁵ The same problem of national orientation, but in another region of Habsburg Ukraine, is the subject of Paul Robert Magocsi's study, *The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848-1948*, Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies (Cam-

one time or another sections of the church supported each of these orientations.

Religion, or rather rite, was one of the most constant factors differentiating Ukrainians from Poles. To anyone but the professional ethnographer, Galician Ukrainian folkways were not much more different from Galician Polish folkways than were Kashubian folkways. In any case, the old folk traditions were eroded in the real crucible of national consciousness—the city. Language differences were also not so profound as they appear to the linguist, who can neatly classify Polish as West and Ukrainian as East Slavic: the two languages had borrowed much from each other over the centuries, especially lexically, and they were mutually intelligible. The Ukrainian of Kolomyia could converse more easily with a Pole from Rzeszów than with a Russian from Voronezh. In the early nineteenth century it was not implausible to regard Ukrainian as a dialect of Polish. True, there was a visible difference in that the Ukrainians used the Cyrillic alphabet, and several attempts were made in the nineteenth century to have Ukrainians switch to Latin characters. (The attempts failed, not least because of the opposition of Greek Catholic clergymen, whose liturgical books were all in Slavonic with Cyrillic script, as they had been for nearly a thousand years.)²⁶ The city and education also tended to erase language differences; Ukrainians who went to the artisan's workshop or university were likely later to find themselves (or their children) more comfortable speaking Polish than Ukrainian. Moreover, as William Lockwood has pointed out, "languages . . . are not mutually exclusive as are religious affiliations."²⁷

bridge, Mass., 1978). See my criticism: "The Formation of National Identity in Subcarpathian Rus': Some Questions of Methodology," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 2, no. 3 (September 1978): 374–80.

²⁶ See Ivan Franko, "Azbuchna viina v Halychyni 1859 r.," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* 114 (1913): 81–116; 115 (1913): 131–53; 116 (1913): 87–125. For a general overview of the language problem, see Paul R. Magocsi, "The Language Question as a Factor in the National Movement in Eastern Galicia," in *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia*, ed. Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 220–38.

²⁷ "One can be bilingual or even trilingual and hence, to at least some degree, bi- or tri-cultural. One can thus shift back and forth between two or even three cultural idioms. These are options essentially unavailable to members of ethnic groups based on religion." William G. Lockwood, "Religion and Language as Criteria of Ethnic Identity: An Exploratory Comparison," in *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Southeastern Europe*, ed. Sam Beck and John W. Cole (Amsterdam, 1981), p. 76.

Rite remained a persistent and unequivocal marker of national identity. Baptism into the Greek Catholic church was almost indelible, especially after the Habsburgs had the ecclesiastical authorities regulate the transition from one rite to another so as to assure the preservation of each. It was also hereditary, since Greek Catholic parents could not baptize their children in the Latin rite. The church, then, preserved a mark of Ukrainian ethnicity even in cases of linguistic and cultural assimilation to the Polish nationality. Outside the city, Ukrainian peasants regarded as Poles all who attended the Latin-rite church, even if (as was the case with the so-called *latynnyky*) they had been linguistically, ethnographically, and socially integrated into the Ukrainian peasantry. In Galicia division by rite eventually became *the* line of demarcation between Ukrainians and Poles. When the first Ukrainian national political organization (the Supreme Ruthenian Council) was formed in 1848, its statutes opened membership to any Galician-born Ukrainian of the Greek Catholic church "admitting through his faith to the Ruthenian nationality."²⁸ The Greek Catholic higher clergy intensified the political significance of the religious distinction by its devotion to the Habsburgs and opposition to the revolutionary Polish national movement.

There was a period when a significant part of the Greek Catholic church, namely, the lower clergy, blurred the national distinction between Poles and Ukrainians by assimilating to both Polish culture and Polish political ideals.²⁹ This assimilation can best be understood as a consequence of the original Habsburg educational reforms. The immediate result of education was to transform the mass of the Greek Catholic clergy into an elite far above their parishioners. While in 1780 the Greek Catholic priest could, for better

²⁸ Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją*, p. 36. As Kozik notes, however, the rule was not enforced and some Roman Catholics who considered themselves Ukrainian were also permitted to join. Iakiv Holovats'kyi wrote in 1841: "A person in Galicia usually only calls himself a Ruthenian if he professes Greek Catholicism; as soon as he changes his faith to the Latin rite, which now often happens, then he ceases to be a Ruthenian and is called a Pole." Cited in Kozik, *Ukraiński ruch narodowy*, p. 25.

²⁹ The higher clergy had encouraged linguistic Polonization in the early nineteenth century: *Ukraiński ruch narodowy*, p. 36. By the middle of the century the process of linguistic Polonization was complete. Ann Sirka, *The Nationality Question in Austrian Education: The Case of Ukrainians in Galicia 1867-1914*, European University Studies: ser. 3, History and Allied Studies, 124 (Frankfurt a.M., 1980), p. 5. In 1848 a Polish publicist stated that the fact that Greek Catholic priests spoke Polish proved Polish should remain the language of educated Ukrainians. Kasper Cięglewicz, *Rzecz czerwono-ruska 1848 roku* [Lviv, 1848], p. 2.

or worse, feel at home in the village tavern with the peasants,³⁰ by 1830 his counterparts were seeking more refined company. While in 1770 most candidates for the Greek Catholic priesthood had no access to educated society, by the first decades of the nineteenth century they were mingling with Polish students in Lviv. To shed one's proximity, cultural and social, to the peasant meant to be elevated to a status that did not yet fit in with Ukrainian society. Just as, on an individual scale, emigration to the city entailed eventual adoption of the dominant Polish culture, so, too, promotion on the social scale at first entailed the Polonization of an entire stratum.

Until 1848 the language in daily use among Greek Catholic seminarians in Lviv was Polish. Bishops and seminary authorities had to issue regulation after regulation to inculcate in the seminarians some knowledge of the Ukrainian language and the Cyrillic alphabet.³¹ In 1840 even Antin Petrushevych, the son of a priest and later a staunch Old Ruthenian patriot and eminent historian of Galician Ukraine, failed his examination in *lingua ruthenica* because he could not read Cyrillic.³² And the seminarians were more than linguistically Polonized: in the 1830s and 1840s the Greek Catholic seminary in Lviv became a hotbed of the Polish revolutionary movement.³³ One rector of the seminary deliberately encouraged Ukrainian studies at the seminary as an antidote to Polish revolutionism.³⁴ When the 1848 revolution broke out, many Greek

³⁰ Korczok, *Die griechisch-katholische Kirche*, p. 13. The peasantry was initially alienated by the novelty of an educated clergy. "When the new priests came from the seminar [in Lviv], they already had a higher education and greater demands, so that the people did not become accustomed to them quickly, did not like them very much and called them 'German priests' (*nimets'ki ks'ondzy*).'" Fylymon Tarnavs'kyi, *Spohady: Rodynna khronika Tarnavs'kykh iak prychnok do istorii tserkovnykh, sviashchenyts'kykh, pobutovykh, ekonomichnykh i politychnykh vidnosyn u Halychyni v druhii polovyni XIX storichchia i v pershii dekadii XX storichchia*, ed. Anatol' Mariia Bazylevych and Roman Ivan Danylevych (Toronto, 1981), pp. 34–35.

³¹ Studyns'kyi, *L'vivs'ka dukhovna seminariia*, pp. ccxxxiii–ccxl.

³² Studyns'kyi, *L'vivs'ka dukhovna seminariia*, p. ccxxxix.

³³ Studyns'kyi, *L'vivs'ka dukhovna seminariia*, pp. xciv–cx, cxii–cxiii, cxvi–clxxxviii, ccvi–ccxi. Also: Kyrylo Studyns'kyi, "Pol's'ki konspiratsii sered rus'kykh pytomtsiv i dukhoven'stva v Halychyni v rokakh 1831–46," *Zapysky Naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka* 80 (1907):53–108, and 83 (1908):87–177.

³⁴ The rector was Venedykt Levyts'kyi, who also served as the censor for Ukrainian-language books in Galicia from 1834 to 1848. Although in 1836 he recommended Ukrainian studies as a means to frustrate the plans of "perverse men" to spread "pernicious doctrines" among seminarians, he had previously (1834) blocked the publication of the first almanac of the Ruthenian Triad, *Zoria*,

Catholic seminarians in Lviv pinned Polish cocardes to their breasts and donned the distinctive Polish revolutionary headgear; among them was Ivan Naumovych, later a fiercely anti-Polish and even Russophile political activist. Some seminarians were so carried away by their sympathies as to join Polish insurgents at the barricades.³⁵ Some Ukrainian priests also joined the Polish National Council in 1848 instead of the Supreme Ruthenian Council; Bishop Hryhorii Iakhymovych (Lviv suffragan, 1841–49) had to prohibit their participation by a decree of 12 May 1848.³⁶

The year 1848 marked a turning point.³⁷ Thereafter, with few exceptions,³⁸ Greek Catholic priests and seminarians became not only aloof from, but hostile to, the Polish national movement. This change of direction sprang from nothing within the church per se. The ultimate rejection of Polonism by the clergy was the result of Ukrainian society's impact on the church, not the reverse. A new Ukrainian society, free from serfdom, socially more diversified, and politically more experienced, had been forged by the revolutionary struggle of 1848 and tempered by the epilogue of that struggle in the 1860s, when in the reorganization of the empire the Polish nobility won political control of an autonomous Galicia. By the late 1860s, the *gente Ruthenus, natione Polonus* was forced to make a choice of allegiance,³⁹ because the bitter political struggle had vitiated coexistence between both a Polish and Ukrainian national identity. With the support of the newly emerged secular intelligentsia, the Greek Catholic clergy, ministers of the religion

and subsequently (1837) the Triad's major collection, *Rusalka Dnistrovaia*. Studyns'kyi, *L'vivs'ka dukhovna seminariia*, pp. cxxi, ccliv, 159–60. Kozik, *Ukrainiński ruch narodowy*, pp. 100–105.

³⁵ Studyns'kyi, *L'vivs'ka dukhovna seminariia*, p. ccxxxii. See also Naumovych's autobiography in his *Sobranie sochinenii*, 3 vols. (Lviv, 1926–27), 1, bk. 1: 16–25.

³⁶ Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją*, pp. 39–41.

³⁷ Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją*, pp. 173–74. The re-Ukrainianization of the lower clergy is vividly described in Tarnavs'kyi, *Spoohady*, pp. 19–25.

³⁸ The Ukrainian Marxist Roman Rosdolsky was descended from a long line of Greek Catholic priests. On the national consciousness of his antecedents, he writes: “. . . As late as 1863 some Ukrainian intellectuals participated in the Polish insurrection. Among the latter was the author's great-grandfather; the author's grandfather, however, was already a fervent Ukrainian patriot and an opponent of Polish and Russian rule.” *Zur nationalen Frage*, p. 138, fn. 31.

³⁹ See John-Paul Himka, “Polish and Ukrainian Socialism: Austria, 1867–1890” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1977), p. 130 (“The Membership of the Popular Education Society Prosvita, 1868–74”). A revised, but much abridged version of this thesis has been published: *Socialism in Galicia: The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism (1860–1890)* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983).

that distinguished Ukrainians from Poles, turned its back on the Polish national movement once and for all.⁴⁰

The firm decision not to be Polish was insufficient as a statement of national identity, however. If the Greek Catholics of Galicia were not Poles, who were they? Where were their co-nationals? In Bukovyna and Subcarpathia? In Right- and Left-Bank Ukraine? In St. Petersburg and Moscow? Neither the revolution of 1848 nor the political battles of the 1860s had settled these questions. Again, nothing in the Greek Catholic church itself ultimately resolved this, but the church did take part in the search for national self-knowledge and it made its attitudes felt.

The Russophile orientation was initiated by secular intellectuals,⁴¹ but as long as it survived the orientation had a following in the Greek Catholic clergy. Serious problems of religious identity were responsible for the persistent attraction to Russophilism of at least a part of the clergy.⁴² The Greek Catholic had an Orthodox face, Roman Catholic citizenship and, as I have argued, an enlightened Austrian soul. These elements did not fuse into a new religious synthesis. In practice, most priests were content to emphasize their "Austrianism," giving more thought to founding communal granaries than to purely spiritual matters. In the affairs of the spirit and liturgy they were obliged to look either east or west, since Greek Catholicism itself had never had a chance to flourish as an independent religious tradition. There would always be some priests who looked to the living Orthodox tradition in the Russian Empire as the model for their own liturgical and spiritual practices. They wanted to purify the Greek Catholic church of Latin accretions, which by the 1860s had also acquired the political stigma of being Polish-inspired. These purists already existed in the 1830s and 1840s,⁴³ but became influential in the early 1860s. In 1861 a group of Greek Catholic priests, including Ivan Naumovych and Markel Popel' (both of whom were soon to become

⁴⁰ I know of no example of a Greek Catholic priest active in the Polish national movement in Galicia after the late 1860s.

⁴¹ Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism," p. 118.

⁴² One of the curious side effects of the youth ferment of the 1960s was the reappearance of a Russophile trend in Ukrainian Catholic seminaries in North America. Rebellious seminarians visited Russian Orthodox churches and monasteries, coveted Russian Orthodox liturgical and prayer books, dreamed of wearing Russian-style vestments, kolpaks and long beards, and tried to boycott such papish accretions as rosaries and devotions to the Sacred Heart.

⁴³ Korczok, *Die griechisch-katholische Kirche*, pp. 134-35.

prominent Russophiles and later to finish their careers as Orthodox clerics in Russia) began publishing articles and brochures in which they argued that Rome had violated its original agreement with the Uniates by systematic Latinization of their rite. The "ritual movement" (*obriadovyi rukh*), as the campaign was called, induced Metropolitan Hryhorii Iakhymovych (1860–1863) to establish a commission to investigate the need for purification of the rite.⁴⁴ Although the commission was disbanded after Iakhymovych's death, the Easternizers retained some influence in the metropolitan consistory for another two decades. Their complete fall from grace occurred in 1882. In that year the village of Hnylychky announced its intention to convert to the Orthodox faith; Naumovych and several others were prosecuted for high treason as Russian agents; and Metropolitan Iosyf Sembratovych (1870–1882) was forced to resign for failing to curb Russian and Orthodox tendencies in his clergy.⁴⁵

Russophilism in the clergy was never to be entirely eradicated under Austrian rule, but the events of 1882 demonstrate the limits of its appeal to Greek Catholics. With the growing estrangement of Austria and Russia, the imperial authorities, and therefore the Habsburg-loyal hierarchy, would tolerate it less and less. More importantly, the religious and national Russophilism of the clergy could lead to the negation of Greek Catholicism itself. In seeking to restore the rite to its purity before the union, the Easternizers came very close to a return to Orthodoxy, and in fact many of them did convert. The church which had been formed precisely as a defection from Orthodoxy had to keep Orthodoxy at a safe distance in order to survive.

The limits of Russophilism's popularity in the church as a whole were partly determined by the tsar's unflinching hostility to Uniatism. The last Uniate metropolitan of Kiev died in St. Petersburg in 1805.⁴⁶ In 1839 the union was suppressed in Lithuania, Belorussia, and Volhynia, which provoked a letter of protest from Metropolitan Levyts'kyi of Galicia in 1841.⁴⁷ In the 1860s and early 1870s the Russian government recruited a large contingent of Galician

⁴⁴ Dmitrii Vientskovskii, *Grigorii Iakhimovich i sovremennoe russkoe dvizhenie. Ocherk* (Lviv, 1892), pp. 77–78.

⁴⁵ Korczok, *Die griechisch-katholische Kirche*, p. 139.

⁴⁶ Pelesz, *Geschichte der Union*, 2:595.

⁴⁷ *Nacherk istorii unii ruskoi tserkvy z Rymom* (Lviv, 1896), p. 98.

priests and intellectuals to work in the last surviving Uniate diocese of Kholm (Chełm), only to abolish the union there in 1875.⁴⁸ From the turn of the century until World War I, well-financed Russian agents propagated Orthodoxy in Galicia and, much more successfully, among Galician emigrants in North America; this battle for souls, religious and national, further embittered relations between Russian and Russophile Orthodox and Ukrainian Greek Catholics.⁴⁹ Finally, during the Russian occupation of Galicia in 1914–1915, the Greek Catholic metropolitan, Andrei Sheptyts'kyi (1901–1944), was arrested and exiled to Russia, while the Russian Orthodox bishop of Kholm, Evlogii (Vladimir Georgievskii), undertook the forcible conversion of Galicians to the Orthodox faith.⁵⁰ Thus, although Russophilism would always have a certain resonance in the clergy owing to Greek Catholicism's straddling of two religious heritages, it could never become dominant without the suspension of the union that made Uniatism Uniatism.⁵¹

The Greek Catholic church would ultimately throw its weight behind neither the Polish nor the Russian solution to the national identity crisis of the Ruthenians. The safest ground for Greek Catholicism was some third way. Since religiously Greek Catholics were threatened by both Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy, then nationally they would be better off as neither Poles nor Russians.

But again, this negative answer to the question of national self-identification was insufficient. Although several solutions to the Galician national identity crisis that were neither Polish nor Russian

⁴⁸ An excellent account of the Russian government's recruitment in the 1860s is given in Jan Kozik's "Moskalofilstwo w Galicji w latach 1848–1866 na tle odrodzenia narodowego Rusinów" (M.A. thesis, Jagellonian University, 1958), pp. 155–73.

⁴⁹ Korczok, *Die griechisch-katholische Kirche*, pp. 140–43.

⁵⁰ Korczok, *Die griechisch-katholische Kirche*, pp. 144–46. See also *Tsars'kyi viazen'* (Lviv, 1918).

⁵¹ Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi did attempt to restore the original Eastern spirit to Ukrainian Catholicism. But because he also devoted so much time to missionary activity in the East, i.e., to uniting the Orthodox with Rome, Ukrainian Catholicism was not exposed to the dangers that the longing for purification had traditionally posed. See, for example, Gregor Prokoptschuk, *Der Metropolit: Leben und Wirken des grossen Förderers der Kirchenunion Graf Andreas Scheptytzkyj* (Munich, 1955), pp. 123–84. Sheptyts'kyi understood what drew some of his priests to Russophilism, and accorded them a relative tolerance that led to an open conflict with the editor of *Dilo*, Lonhyn Tsehels'kyi, in 1908. Kost' Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky halys'kykh ukrainstiv, 1848–1914*, 2 vols. (Zhovkva, 1926–27), 2:494–95 (see also 1:371).

might have been possible,⁵² historical reality only offered two: to be Austro-Ruthenian (i.e., to limit the territorial base of the nation to Galicia, Bukovyna, and Subcarpathia) or to be all-Ukrainian (i.e., to identify also with the Ukrainian nation in southwestern Russia). In Galicia the Austro-Ruthenian solution never crystallized to the extent it did in Subcarpathia, but it did exist as an underlying attitude, particularly in the church and particularly in the period from the 1830s to the 1870s.

The two conceptions rarely clashed openly in Galicia. Even the bitter conflict between the Ruthenian Triad and their ecclesiastical superiors in the 1830s⁵³ did not focus explicitly on the issue of national identity. The Triad was persecuted and their works banned because of "superfluous innovations"⁵⁴ in orthography and lexicon. Yet implicit in the dissension was dissonance between a new conception of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian nationality that looked beyond Galicia to the Slavic awakening throughout Eastern Europe and the Austrocentric conception traditionally held by the Greek Catholic hierarchy.

Austro-Ruthenianism was ascendent in the decade following the defeat of the 1848 revolution, when the Greek Catholic hierarchy was the only quasi-official representative of the Ruthenian national movement. Those who adhered to it were known by the 1860s as Old Ruthenians, or members of the St. George party (after St. George's Cathedral in Lviv, seat of the Galician metropolitan). By then they were already in eclipse, as the constitutional era allowed Russophiles and pan-Ukrainians to come to the fore. Those Old Ruthenians who survived beyond the 1860s had to ally with the Russophile camp, which tolerated them because their conservative, etymological linguistic principles were close to those of the

⁵² For instance, a single national identity embracing the whole former Polish-Lithuanian *Rus'* was theoretically possible. The weakness of the Belorussian national movement prevented this conception from emerging, however.

⁵³ "The young Ukrainian intelligentsia's break with the leaders of the church was total before the Springtime of Peoples." Kozik, *Ukrainiński ruch narodowy*, p. 17. As was mentioned above, Bishop Snihurs'kyi was an exception among the church leaders in his support of the young awakeners. Later the Greek Catholic hierarchy was to honor the memory of the Triad and particularly of its leader, Markiian Shashkevych. On the hundredth anniversary of Shashkevych's birth (1911), Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was to say: "That the first person in Galicia to turn to the people was a priest . . . —this is our glory and we take pride in it today." Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky*, 2: 587–88.

⁵⁴ Father Iosyf Levyts'kyi, grammarian, cited in Kozik, *Ukrainiński ruch narodowy*, p. 104.

Russophiles themselves, and because the Russophiles were in any case constrained to mute their political irredentism to avoid charges of disloyalty to the Austrian state. A number of Old Ruthenians, however, also joined the Ukrainian movement.⁵⁵

National populism (*narodovstvo*), as the Ukrainian movement proper was known, was primarily the child of secular intellectuals, not just native Galicians, but people from Russian-ruled Ukraine as well.⁵⁶ The church as such did not spark its emergence, but once the movement had consolidated its hold on Ukrainian society, the church actively supported it. The church's contribution to the movement's victory was the inherently anti-Polish and anti-Russian bias of Greek Catholicism. In a society without a secular intelligentsia, however, the church might have preferred a narrow Austro-Ruthenian orientation (as was the case in Subcarpathia).⁵⁷ After all, the Ruthenians of Galicia and Subcarpathia were Greek Catholic, and there were Greek Catholic missions in Orthodox Bukovyna, but the Orthodox Ukrainians in the tsarist empire were absolutely beyond redemption.

THE CHURCH AND THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT

The Greek Catholic church was extremely important to the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia throughout the nineteenth century.⁵⁸ As a consequence of the Josephine educational reforms, and of exposure to the Slavic awakeners in Vienna, the Greek Catholic clergy became the pioneers of Galicia's Ukrainian renaissance.⁵⁹ The grammarians who paved the way for the Ruthenian Triad were priests. Of forty-three books published in Galicia in the Ukrainian language between 1837 and 1850, forty

⁵⁵ The best study of these issues is Kozik's "Moskalofilstwo." See also Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism," pp. 117-19, 130-31, 215-17.

⁵⁶ Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism," pp. 120-26, 131-37.

⁵⁷ Magocsi, *Shaping of a National Identity*, p. 187; see also Himka, "Formation of National Identity," pp. 378-79. The Rusyn-Ruthenian orientations in Subcarpathia and Galicia were analogous, but not altogether identical; after the Compromise of 1867, when Subcarpathian Ruthenians found themselves under Magyar and Galician Ruthenians under Austro-Polish rule, differences became more noticeable.

⁵⁸ For a catalogue of the clergy's contribution to the national movement, see Isy-dor Sokhots'kyi, *Shcho daly hreko-katolyts'ka Tserkva i dukhovensvo ukrains'komu narodovi* (Philadelphia, 1951).

⁵⁹ See Winter, *Der Josefismus*, p. 150, and Kozik, *Ukraiński ruch narodowy*, p. 88.

were written by clergymen.⁶⁰ During the 1848 revolution, Bishop Iakhymovych presided over the Supreme Ruthenian Council and served as the Ukrainian representative to the Austrian constitutional commission. The Supreme Ruthenian Council held its first meetings in the consistory of St. George's Cathedral and later met in a hall of the Greek Catholic seminary. Greek Catholic deaneries formed the organizational base for the council's branches outside Lviv. So pervasive was the Greek Catholic clergy's influence in 1848 that a Polish activist accused it of trying to establish a theocracy.⁶¹ In the 1850s the Greek Catholic hierarchy replaced the council as the representative of Ukrainian society.⁶² From the late 1860s through the 1890s (and beyond) priests were active in the village, building the infrastructure of a popular mass movement; they founded temperance organizations, reading clubs, cooperatives and other voluntary associations, and they participated in politics as electoral agitators and elected representatives at every level of government, from village council to parliament.⁶³ Without their activism the Ukrainian movement could not have developed the degree of mass support it commanded by the turn of the century.

Channelling so much energy into the national movement eventually placed the church in the dangerous position of acting and being regarded as an instrument of a secular movement.⁶⁴ The church's identity as church was becoming blurred. For the clergy, efforts on

⁶⁰ Kozik, *Ukrainski ruch narodowy*, p. 94.

⁶¹ This was Kasper Cięglewicz speaking at the Prague Slav Congress: Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją*, p. 72. See also Cięglewicz, *Rzecz czerwono-ruska*, p. 5. A similar point was made by the Polish democrat Florian Ziemiałkowski in January 1849 at a session of the constitutional commission of the Kroměříž Reichstag. Rudolf Wagner, ed., *Die Revolutionsjahre 1848/49 im Königreich Galizien-Lodomerien (einschliesslich Bukowina): Dokumente aus österreichischer Zeit* (Munich, 1983), p. 21; see also pp. 59–60, 66–67.

⁶² On the hierarchy's politics in the 1850s, see Vientskovs'kyi, *Grigorii Iakhimovich*, pp. 63–73.

⁶³ See, for example, Oleksii Zaklyns'kyi, *Zapysky parokha Starykh Bohorodchan*, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1960), pp. 99–101; Tarnavs'kyi, *Spohady*, esp. pp. 141–51, 168–87. I have presented a more detailed account of the clergy's activities in the village in "Priests and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian National Movement in Austria, 1867–1900," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 21 (1979): 4–9.

⁶⁴ A similar problem emerged in Romanian Orthodox Transylvania: "As [Bishop] Şaguna discovered, the best interests of Orthodoxy did not always correspond to the aspirations of those who put nation before church. Indeed, the idea of nationality bade fair to replace religious belief itself as the dominant influence on men's minds." Keith Hitchins, *Orthodoxy and Nationality: Andreiu Şaguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania, 1846–1873* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977), p. 173.

behalf of the national movement took precedence over purely spiritual duties, and priests began to think of themselves more as village activists than as ministers of God.⁶⁵ The deteriorating prestige of religion among the secular intelligentsia and peasantry brought this home to the hierarchy by the late 1890s.

Bishop Iulian Sas-Kuilovs'kyi of Stanyslaviv (1891–1899) felt obliged to call his clergy to order in 1899, instructing it to preach the Gospel instead of organizing reading clubs.⁶⁶ His successor, Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, did the same in 1902, admonishing priests to keep clear of political bickering and to devote themselves to their vocations.⁶⁷ During the First World War Bishop Hryhorii Khomyshyn of Stanyslaviv (1904–1946) issued a pastoral letter lamenting that “the church and the faith have become subordinate to the national question, and these higher factors have become regarded as means to lesser aims.”⁶⁸

Although Khomyshyn and Sheptyts'kyi were in agreement about the perils of absorption into the national movement, their methods of dealing with the problem differed. Khomyshyn favored the church's withdrawal from the movement in order to concentrate on its spiritual mission. Sheptyts'kyi's policy was more complex. He envisioned a restored church, with its spirituality not only intact but flourishing, intervening positively and actively in national affairs, yet unafraid to censure actions that might be beneficial to the national cause but inconsistent with Christian principles. Thus, in 1901, concerned about the prevalence of religious indifferentism, agnosticism, and even atheism among educated Ukrainians, Sheptyts'kyi wrote a special pastoral letter to the secular intelligentsia, explaining why, in an age of reason, it was still important

⁶⁵ “Although I came from a priest's family and was always raised in a priest's home, I could never find in those families or in the churches or in our services as they were then celebrated anything that would nurture me religiously and encourage me to turn to God. . . . Although the families in which I was raised were very honorable, they concentrated their attention on the national aspect, with less attention to the religious aspect. . . . Listening to the conversations in our families, I always heard only about politics, economic matters, family and neighborhood concerns, local village affairs; but I never heard discussions on working to elevate the youth morally and religiously, on religious organizations and how to manage them.” Tarnavs'kyi, *Spoľady*, pp. 80–81.

⁶⁶ Himka, “Priests and Peasants,” pp. 9–10.

⁶⁷ Levyts'kyi, *Istoria politychnoi dumky*, 1:371.

⁶⁸ Korczok, *Die griechisch-katholische Kirche*, p. 151.

to hold to the Christian faith.⁶⁹ In 1908 he risked a complete break with the leaders of the national movement in order to condemn the assassination of the Galician governor, Count Andrzej Potocki, by the Ukrainian student Myroslav Sichyns'kyi.⁷⁰ Although the metropolitan was willing to take unpopular stands on certain questions, he was also ready to lend the full weight of his moral authority to those Ukrainian national demands which he could support. In the school commission of the Galician diet and in the Austrian house of lords Sheptyts'kyi championed the expansion of Ukrainian secondary schools and the establishment of a Ukrainian university in Lviv;⁷¹ these were among the causes most ardently pursued by the national movement in the fifteen years before World War I. He even supported Ukrainian students in their secession from Lviv University in 1901 by closing down the Greek Catholic seminary in Lviv (this quite surprised the Austrian minister of education, who did not expect such radical action from an aristocratic bishop).⁷² Sheptyts'kyi was also active in another major issue raised by the national movement on the eve of World War I: increasing Ukrainian representation in the Galician diet. In fact, he played a crucial part in working out the final agreement of the diet reform in 1914.⁷³ In addition Sheptyts'kyi was a magnanimous patron of Ukrainian culture and the founder of a national museum in Lviv (1905).⁷⁴ His prestige as a Ukrainian patriot and moral example soared when the tsarist authorities arrested and exiled him during the occupation of Galicia in 1914.⁷⁵ Largely owing to his own

⁶⁹ "Do ukrains'koi inteligentsii," in Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, *Tvory*, vol. 1: *Pastyr's'ki lysty* (2.VIII.1899 r. – 7.IX.1901 r.), Pratsi Ukrains'koho bohoslavs'koho naukovoho tovarystva, 15 (Toronto, 1965), pp. 190–214.

⁷⁰ Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky*, 2: 476, 480.

⁷¹ Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky*, 1: 368, 2: 544.

⁷² Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky*, 1: 359.

⁷³ Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky*, 2: 685–86 (see also 2: 652). Sirka, *Nationality Question*, p. 155.

⁷⁴ Prokoptschuk, *Der Metropolit*, pp. 249–51. The museum continues to exist in the Ukrainian SSR as the Lviv State Museum of Ukrainian Art; Soviet publications avoid mentioning the museum's origins.

⁷⁵ In the eighteenth century the Sheptyts'kyi family had produced three successive Greek Catholic bishops of Lviv: Varlaam (1710–15), Atanasii (1715–46), and Lev (1749–79). But in the nineteenth century the Sheptyts'kyis were completely Polonized and had even switched to the Latin rite. When the young Polish count Roman Szeptycki returned to the rite of his ancestors, entered the monastery (where he took the name Andrei), and rapidly advanced in a Greek Catholic ecclesiastical career, Ukrainian society initially feared that a Polish agent was being promoted in the Ukrainian church. Sheptyts'kyi's statements and actions in support of the

personal qualities and grand vision, Sheptyts'kyi succeeded during his lifetime in restoring the Ukrainian Catholic church as an independent moral and spiritual authority, allied to the national movement, but separate and critical.

RELATIONS WITH THE INTELLIGENTSIA

The Greek Catholic clergy nurtured the formation of a Ukrainian intelligentsia in the 1840s in two ways. First, priests' sons formed the initial cadres of the intelligentsia and continued to be an important source for its expansion into the twentieth century. Second, the Greek Catholic hierarchy deliberately fostered the emergence of an educated Ukrainian elite outside the ranks of the clergy. For instance, in 1845 Bishop Iakhymovych tried to dissuade a fourth-year law student at the University of Vienna from entering the seminary; he argued that a lawyer could do more good for the Ukrainians than could yet another priest.⁷⁶ In 1847 Bishop Snihurs'kyi urged Ivan Holovats'kyi to dedicate his forthcoming publication to a Ukrainian prominent in law or government service in order to "show the world that not only clergymen are true Ruthenians, but also secular persons of high dignity do not reject their Ruthenianism. . . ."⁷⁷ During the 1848 revolution, two of the five places in the presidium of the Supreme Ruthenian Council were reserved for secular figures, and a *numerus clausus* was imposed on clergy in the council's branches outside Lviv.⁷⁸

Ukrainian movement did much to alleviate suspicion concerning the sincerity of his religious and national conversion. Still, whenever he felt morally bound to take one of his unpopular stands, critics were quick to say that his true—Polish aristocratic—colors were showing and to make comparisons with Mickiewicz's Wallenrod. His courage on behalf of nation and faith in 1914, however, seems to have consummated his acceptance by Ukrainian society.

⁷⁶ Zaklyns'kyi, *Zapysky*, p. 29.

⁷⁷ Ivan Holovats'kyi in a letter to his brother Iakiv, cited in Kozik, *Ukraiński ruch narodowy*, p. 293; see also p. 93.

⁷⁸ In addition to the council's president, Bishop Iakhymovych, the presidium consisted of two vice-presidents and two secretaries. One vice-president and one secretary were high-ranking priests or canons (*kanoniky*); the remaining vice-president and secretary were laymen. In theory local branches of the council were to consist of thirty members, of whom no more than ten were to be priests; in practice the local branches varied in both size and clerical participation. Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją*, pp. 36, 38.

In the 1840s the secular intelligentsia filially deferred to the clergy. On the eve of the 1848 revolution, in early February, the governor of Galicia agreed to the publication of what was intended to be the first Ukrainian-language periodical in Galicia. The secular figures promoting the project immediately sought a priest to be their editor.⁷⁹

By the 1860s and 1870s, however, the intelligentsia had become stronger both in numbers⁸⁰ and influence. Some members of the clergy welcomed this development unreservedly. At the first general meeting of the Ukrainian popular education society Prosvita in December 1868, Father Iosyf Zaiachkivs'kyi summoned the secular intelligentsia to replace the clergy at the head of the Ukrainian nation:

for we are not disposed to struggle, but are rather apostles of peace. We were frightened by the storm [the 1848 revolution] and began to look behind us to protect our backs; we withdrew to such an extent that we lost sight of the people and the people lost sight of us. Now you gentlemen want to stand in our place and to carry forward the enlightenment of the people beyond the point at which we have stopped. For this the people thank you and may God bless you.⁸¹

The intelligentsia's assumption of leadership was, to be sure, neither complete nor totally free of conflict. For example, Metropolitan Iakhymovych had initially endorsed and partially subsidized the first major newspaper to be edited by secular intellectuals (*Slovo*, 1861–1887). But when that paper published criticism of the hierarchy (by a member of the lower clergy), Iakhymovych immediately cooled towards the project.⁸² The Ukrainophile movement of the early 1860s was at times openly critical of the clergy's role in national life.⁸³ Still, by the late 1860s—when the constitutional era was firmly established in Austria, the political status of Galicia settled (essentially under Polish domination), and the major camps and structures of the Ukrainian national movement in place—both the Russophile and national populist establishments

⁷⁹ Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją*, p. 18.

⁸⁰ In the twenty years since the 1848 revolution, "the Ruthenian intelligentsia . . . has grown larger; in addition to Ruthenian priests we now have Ruthenian teachers and civil servants. . . ." *Kalendar "Prosvity" na rik 1870*, cited in Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky*, 2:732.

⁸¹ Cited in Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia politychnoi dumky*, 1:112.

⁸² Vientskovskii, *Grigorii Iakhimovich*, pp. 75–76.

⁸³ Himka, *Socialism in Galicia*, p. 44.

were at peace with the church. The national movement at that time worked on the basis of a largely informal, but sometimes clearly expressed agreement between the secular intelligentsia and the clergy. The clergy would carry the national movement into the village, and the intelligentsia would allow the church considerable influence on the goals and ideology of the movement.⁸⁴

The agreement was tenable into the 1890s. Then the intelligentsia took decisive control of the movement away from the clergy, and the church found itself in the perilous position of being the instrument of an estranged, and often overtly hostile, movement. The rotten eggs thrown at Metropolitan Syl'vester Sembratovych (1885–1898) in 1893⁸⁵ and at Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi in 1910⁸⁶ symbolized the change of heart since 1848, when timid intellectuals looked for a priest to edit their periodical and a bishop to preside over their representative political organization.

Militant anticlericalism and even atheism had been present in Ukrainian society since the 1870s, but their expression was confined to a young, radical minority. The radicals' opposition to the church was not merely an adjunct to their socialist beliefs, but a cornerstone of their whole world outlook. Their ardent insistence on atheism and anticlericalism set them apart from the Polish socialists of Galicia, who could not understand the Ukrainians' obsession with the church.⁸⁷ At its core was a strongly felt need on the part of some Ukrainian intellectuals to emancipate themselves

⁸⁴ A characteristic incident occurred in 1889, when the radical Mykhailo Pavlyk was editor of *Bat'kivshchyna*, the national populist newspaper for the peasantry. The national populists were disturbed by the anticlerical tone Pavlyk was introducing into the paper and wanted him to abandon criticism of the clergy. Vasyl' Nahirnyi, one of the most prominent national populists, told Pavlyk: "Through the intercession of the saints to God, through the intercession of the priests to the people." M. Pavlyk, ed., *Perepyska Mykhaila Drahomanova z Mykhailom Pavlykom (1876–1895)*, 7 vols., numbered 2–8 (Chernivtsi, 1910–12), 5:357.

⁸⁵ This was the work of Russophile students attending the University of Vienna. Sembratovych had led a pilgrimage to Rome and was returning to Galicia via Vienna. The students met him at the railway station and pelted him with rotten eggs. They accused Sembratovych of working for the Vatican against the Ukrainian church because he wanted to introduce a celibate clergy. "Zbezcheshchenie mytropolyta," *Khliborob*, 1893, no. 11–12, p. 72.

⁸⁶ This was occasioned by lingering anger over Sheptyts'kyi's condemnation of the Potocki assassination two years earlier. In 1910 the metropolitan was visiting Ukrainian settlements in Canada; the egging took place in Winnipeg. "Mytropolyt Sheptyts'kyi v Vinnipehu," *Ukrains'kyi holos* (Winnipeg), 1910, no. 31, p. 3. "Graf A. Sheptyts'kyi i Myr. Sichyns'kyi," *Ukrains'kyi holos*, 1910, no. 31, p. 4.

⁸⁷ Ivan Franko, *Monoloh ateista* (Lviv, 1973), p. 171.

completely from the clergy's tutelage. In 1890 a purgative anticlericalism emerged from underground with the formation of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party, and many of its assumptions became hegemonic in the larger Ukrainian movement. As that decade progressed, the national movement underwent a radical metamorphosis which left the balance of secular and clerical forces permanently altered.⁸⁸

PRIESTS AND THE AWAKENING VILLAGE

The priest's authority in the national movement from the late 1860s to the 1890s rested on his relationship to the peasant. For decades the urban intelligentsia was unable to communicate with the largely illiterate peasantry without the clergy's mediation. The clergy for long was the only bridge between the worlds of the city-based national movement and the peasantry in the countryside. The priest was the only figure in the village who combined Ukrainian nationality, a university education, economic independence, and sanctioned authority. His support for the national movement was crucial for its penetration through the masses, and this was why until the 1890s the intelligentsia diligently avoided offending him. What unravelled the knot binding the intelligentsia to the clergy was the progress of the national movement among the peasants. The priest had fostered that progress, but ultimately it undermined his authority in the village and built new bridges between intelligentsia and peasantry that made his own services expendable.

Even in the brief interlude of the 1848 revolution, tendencies towards this end were evident. Priests encouraged their parishioners to support the Supreme Ruthenian Council and to take an active interest in politics, but they were not prepared for the autonomy of the new peasant activism they had awakened. They were dismayed to discover that peasants preferred to send other peasants,

⁸⁸ Anticlericalism in Galicia, as in the rest of Austria, often had a Josephine tinge. See Valjavec, *Der Josephinismus*, pp. 77, 99, 161. Ukrainian radicals reprinted a Josephine patent fixing the fees for sacramental rites; these fees were much lower than those actually in practice in the late nineteenth century, and the peasantry was easily roused to indignation by the contrast between what the emperor had decreed and what the priests actually took from them.

rather than priests, to the Reichstag.⁸⁹ Moreover, these peasant deputies waged a campaign for the abolition of the sacramental fees paid to the clergy.⁹⁰

Priests again took up propagation of the rural national movement during the last third of the nineteenth century, at the risk of undermining their authority in the awakening villages. Much of the priest's authority rested on the cultural difference between the educated pastor and his ignorant parishioners; yet the whole purpose of the national enlightenment was to raise the cultural level of the Ukrainian peasant. Priests taught peasants the importance of political action, but this necessarily implied their own displacement from the center of the political stage. The clergy founded cultural, political, and economic organizations in the villages, but control of these organizations soon passed out of their hands and into those of peasants. The new peasant that the priest had created belonged to a reading club and entertained political opinions; he could not help but view the priest differently than his father had before him.

The tensions implicit in this fundamental rearrangement of the priest-peasant relationship were magnified by the ideology of the Greek Catholic clergy. In the late 1860s and 1870s the clergy's slogans for the peasantry were enlightenment, sobriety, diligence, and thrift. It was not hard for the awakening peasant to see through the paternalism of this program; some resented its implicit stereotype of the ignorant, drunken, lazy, and spendthrift peasant.⁹¹

⁸⁹ Of twenty-five Galician Ukrainian deputies elected to the Reichstag in 1848, fifteen were peasants, eight were priests and two belonged to the secular intelligentsia. Kozik, *Między reakcją a rewolucją*, pp. 86–87.

⁹⁰ Roman Rosdolsky, *Die Bauernabgeordneten im konstituierenden österreichischen Reichstag 1848–1849* (Vienna, 1976), pp. 171–72. The payment of sacramental fees was a point of contention between priest and peasant throughout the Austrian era. *Pravda pro uniiu. Dokumenty i materialy*, 2nd expanded ed. (Lviv, 1968), pp. 94 and 105–106, documents tension over this issue in 1788 and 1846.

⁹¹ This stereotype pervaded one of the booklets most widely distributed by priests to peasants: Father Stepan Kachala's *Shcho nas hubyt' a shcho nam pomochoy mozhe. Pys'mo dlia rus'kykh selian* (Lviv, 1869). Kachala's booklet appears (anonymously) in a story by Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, who has one of his peasant characters say the following: "In some books you can read that the peasant of this land is indolent, a poor worker but a diligent drunkard, and stupid. The cantor once read us something like this, but thank God it isn't true." "Das Erntefest," *Galizische Geschichten* (Leipzig, 1875), pp. 171–72. The theme of the drunken, lazy, and ignorant peasant permeated Galician sermon literature. Hankevych, *Sluchainyi propovidy*, pp. 16–17, 113–23. Iulijan Hankevych, *Nedel'nyi propovidy*, 2 vols. (Lviv, 1876), 1:142. Dobrians'kyi, *Nauky tserkovnyi*, pp. 44–45, 54–55, 89, 111, 134, 164, 170, 172–74, 187–89, 197, 203–206, 224, 229–36, 241, 243. See also Himka,

Friction over such matters was compounded by the peasants' traditional economic grievances against the clergy, particularly the objection to sacramental fees.⁹² Thus when the Radical Party formed in 1890 began to publish alternative literature for the peasants, it immediately gained a foothold in the villages. The Greek Catholic church was put on the defensive. In 1892 the hierarchy forbade clergy and faithful to subscribe to the radical newspapers *Narod* and *Khliborob*.⁹³ Five years later the abbot of the Basilian monastery in Lviv, the future metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, counterattacked by establishing a new popular periodical for the peasantry, *Misionar*.⁹⁴ Its "missionary" activities were aimed at the nominally Greek Catholic but now dangerously radicalized Ukrainian peasantry.

That the struggle for souls could be waged largely through the medium of the press pointed to another consequence of the priests' work in the village. The clergy had taught the peasantry the importance of newspapers, as part of its larger task of elevating the peasant culturally and strengthening the Ukrainian village institutionally. By the 1890s, this task had been accomplished so well that peasants could use their cultural elevation and village institutions for autonomous purposes. Not only could they use them against the priests if they so chose, but, most importantly, they could use them to bypass the priest altogether and enter into direct, independent contact with the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The services of the clergy as mediator were now dispensable: the period of the church's protectorate over the national movement had come to a close.

* * *

The crisis of the 1890s had, in the end, a beneficial influence on the church as church, since it forced the hierarchy to undertake the reinforcement of the church's spiritual foundations, which had never been strong. The crisis was also beneficial to the

"Priests and Peasants," pp. 6, 10-11.

⁹² Himka, "Priests and Peasants," pp. 11-12.

⁹³ Ivan Franko, "Movchaty i vidpovidaty!," in *Monoloh ateista*, pp. 194-95. Denys Lukianenko, *Ivan Franko v borot'bi proty religii, tserkvy i Vatikanu* (Kiev, 1955), p. 37.

⁹⁴ Prokoptschuk, *Der Metropolit*, p. 71.

intelligentsia and peasantry, who were able to emancipate themselves politically from the church. The Ukrainian nation had become mature enough to claim independence from the political guardianship of the church. This cannot obscure the fact, however, that it was precisely the Greek Catholic church that had done the most to accelerate the maturation of the Galician Ukrainians into nationhood.

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Priests and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian National Movement in Austria, 1867-1900

The clergy often plays a leading role in the early phases of national movements. This has been especially true in eastern Europe, where Slovak pastors and Slovene bishops adorn the national pantheons. As national movements mature, however, clerical leadership seems to wane.¹ No metaphysical Spirit of Modernization is responsible for this progression from clericalism to secularization in national movements. Instead, the progression appears to derive from real ideological and social contradictions inherent in national movements. Such is the burden of this case study of the rise and decline of clerical leadership in one east European national movement. The present article explores the participation of the Greek Catholic or Uniate clergy in the Ukrainian national movement in Austria.²

There is a saying about Greek Catholics: they never quite escaped Byzantium, and never quite made it to Rome.³ Greek Catholicism inhabits

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1. The Czech scholar Miroslav Hroch has measured the extent of clerical involvement in the national movements of seven nations. Although he notes very significant clerical participation in the earliest phases of all these national movements, he concludes that as the movements developed there was "a universal decline in [the clergy's] participation." *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas: Eine vergleichende Analyse zur gesellschaftlichen Schichtung der patriotischen Gruppen* (Prague, 1968), p. 132.

2. For a brief survey of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia under Austrian rule, see *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, Volodymyr Kubijovyč (ed.), 2 vols. (Toronto, 1963-71), II, 185-90.

3. "...pro uniatu kazhut' zvychajno, shcho vin ani vid Tzarhorodu ne utik, ani do Rymu ne

a middle world between Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy. With Orthodoxy, Greek Catholicism shares ritual and tradition; with Roman Catholicism, dogma and recognition of papal supremacy. Since 1596, when Ukrainian Orthodox bishops at the Council of Brest accepted union with the Roman Catholic Church, the Greek Catholics have been under pressure to conform ever more closely to the Roman Catholic mode of ecclesiastical life. The process of Latinization frequently provoked a reaction among the lower clergy, which sought to preserve traditional religious customs and rituals. Historically, inasmuch as Ukraine has been under Polish rule, Latinization has meant Polonization and the clergy's opposition to it has often therefore been accompanied by and justified in terms of Ukrainian patriotism. Just as the Lithuanian clergy first fought Russification in order to check the penetration of Orthodoxy, so also the Ukrainian clergy opposed Polonization in order to remain faithful to their ancestral religious traditions. In both the Lithuanian and Ukrainian cases, the clergy, in following the particular interests of its station, contributed significantly to the development of the national movement.⁴

In the last part of the nineteenth century, the Ukrainians in the Russian Empire were Orthodox,⁵ while those under the Austrian monarchy were Greek Catholic. In Russia, where Orthodoxy was the state religion, religion served to *integrate* Ukrainians into all-Russian society. In Austrian Galicia, however, religion *differentiated* the Ukrainians from the Roman Catholic Poles, who cohabited and — after 1868 — ruled the relatively autonomous crownland of Galicia. Religion, then, was important to the Ukrainian national movement in Austria, but superfluous to the movement in Russia. While in Russia the Orthodox clergy had been Russified and only part of the *secular* intelligentsia identified themselves as Ukrainians, in Galicia the Greek Catholic clergy played an important part in the national movement. In fact, the eminent Polish historian Stefan Kieniewicz has called the Ukrainian national movement in Austria "the most clericalized national movement in Europe."⁶

This is not to say that the Ukrainian movement formed, as it were, a mere branch of ecclesiastical politics. Whatever the contribution of the clergy to a national movement, the most critical role in initiating and directing mass political movements has always been assumed by the secular urban intelligentsia.⁷ It is the intelligentsia — the instigator of the

dobih," Natal' Vakhnianyn, *Prychynky do istorii ruskoj spravy v Halychyni v liakh 1848-1870* (Lviv, 1901), p. 65.

4. Cf., Hroch, p. 132. See also Paul R. Brass, "Ethnicity and Nationality Formation," *Ethnicity*, III, no. 3 (September 1976), 230.

5. The last Uniate diocese in Russia, the Chełm diocese, was dissolved in the 1870s.

6. Review of Hroch in *Przegląd Historyczny*, LXI (1970), no. 1, 151.

periodical press and of diverse national associations — that is the leaven of national formation. This was true, too, in the case of the Ukrainians in Austria, but the peculiarity of this nation was that the secular intelligentsia allowed the clergy an unparalleled degree of influence on the forms, goals and ideology of national politics.

The unique social origin of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Austria encouraged “clericalization.” Unlike the Polish intelligentsia in Galicia, derived from the lower nobility and, to a lesser extent, from pre-modern urban classes, the Ukrainian intelligentsia derived partly from the peasantry, but mainly from the clergy. Greek Catholic priests, like Orthodox but unlike Roman Catholic priests, could marry. The offspring of sacerdotal families frequently would enter the free professions or the bureaucracy.⁸ Bound to the clergy by a network of family connections, the newly emerging Ukrainian intelligentsia also shared a culture with the clergy, not simply an ethnic, Ukrainian culture, but a peculiarly clerical one.

Frederick Hertz, in his classic study, *Nationality in History and Politics*, has noted that in the course of the development of a national movement there is a tendency for the emerging classes of a nation to copy the style and attitudes of the traditional élite: “In former times each rank had its separate mode of life, and it was even prohibited to adopt the costume or habits of a higher rank than one’s own. The development of national unity, however, broke down these barriers, and each class began to imitate as far as possible the style of living of the next higher class.”⁹ Thus it is not surprising that the Polish intelligentsia looked upon the Polish nobility or *szlachta* as a model for behaviour, thereby introducing many aristocratic peculiarities into modern Polish culture. The Ukrainian nobility in Galicia, however, had been Polonized long ago in the seventeenth century. In the latter nineteenth century, when a Ukrainian intelligentsia came into being in Galicia, the highest rank of Ukrainian society was occupied by the clergy. There was nothing unusual, then, in the Ukrainian intelligentsia’s adopting a culture with a pervasive clerical bias. The relatively high prestige of the priestly estate in Ukrainian society as compared to its relatively low prestige in Polish society is evident from the

7. After his comparative, quantitative study of the Czech, Lithuanian, Estonian, Finnish, Norwegian, Flemish and Slovak national movements, Miroslav Hroch concluded: “we can propose only one generalization: the numerically strongest component of patriotic groups consisted of the intelligentsia. With this we are establishing a finding by no means new.” Hroch, p. 118.

8. For an incomplete list of the better known priests’ sons among the Galician Ukrainian intelligentsia, see Isydor Sokhots’kyi, *Shcho daly hreko-katolyts’ka Tserkva i dukhovenstvo ukrains’komu narodovi* (Philadelphia, 1951), p. 39.

9. Frederick Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics: A Study of the Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Character* (London, 1944), p. 44.

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following statistic: between the years 1861 and 1901, in the two Galician universities of Lviv and Cracow, only 9 per cent of the Polish students, but 55 per cent of the Ukrainian students, enrolled in the theological faculty.¹⁰

Kinship ties between the clergy and secular intelligentsia and the sharing of a complex of cultural, behavioural and intellectual presuppositions held to explain why the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia had a decidedly clerical cast. But the Greek Catholic clergy enjoyed such a powerful position of influence and authority in the national movement that something more is required to elucidate the source of this authority: the Ukrainian intelligentsia's *dependence* on the clergy.

From the start of the constitutional era in 1867, the nationally oriented intelligentsia — the so-called national populists (*narodovtsi*) or Ukrainophiles — stood in dire need of support in the countryside. Unlike its Polish counterpart, the Ukrainian intelligentsia could not struggle for power by mobilizing the urban crowd — there were too few Ukrainians in Lviv, the capital of Galicia.¹¹ Nor were the Ukrainians able to come to power through the good graces and political calculation of the central Austrian government: the Polish nobility had already made a compact with Vienna in 1868. Finally, the national populists were unwilling to follow the example of the Galician Russophiles, who put their faith in the power of the Russian tsar. If the national populists, then, were ever to transcend the politics of a coffee-house fraternity, they had to harness to their movement the power of the peasantry. To reach the peasantry, however, the intelligentsia needed the clergy, whence the dependence that allowed the clergy such authority in the national movement.

Even when the national populists, in a radical mood in 1889, called for the "laicization of politics," they immediately pulled the teeth from their demand by adding the following reservation: "By this we do not mean to dislodge our clerics from work on the nation's behalf; on the contrary, we think that the priests, since they are in direct contact with the people, have the opportunity and the duty to do very much for our national and civic

10. Józef Buzek, *Stosunki zawodowe i socyalne ludności w Galicyi według wyznania i narodowości, na podstawie spisu ludności z 31. grudnia 1900 r.*, Wiadomości statystyczne o stosunkach krajowych (Lviv), XX, no. 2 (1905), 42-43. No official admissions criteria discriminated against Ukrainian applicants to non-theological faculties. In 1900, however, fully a third of Galicia's Polish-language inhabitants, but only 6 per cent of its Ukrainian-language inhabitants, worked outside agriculture. It is easy to understand why an overwhelmingly peasant people was disadvantaged in seeking to prepare for a professional career, and why that people would think first of the priesthood as the natural route for social advancement.

11. In 1890, 17 per cent of Lviv's population was Ukrainian by religion and only 7 per cent by language (Umgangssprache). *Österreichische Statistik*, XXXII, no. 1 (1892), 106, 163. See also John-Paul Himka, "Voluntary Artisan Associations and the Ukrainian National

cause."¹² The key to the priests' significance was their "direct contact with the people." The priest was spiritual father and counsellor to the peasant; he was, too, the predecessor and physical progenitor of the secular intellectual. The priesthood, then, was the natural bridge from the intelligentsia to the peasantry.

To start the process of building a popular mass movement, Ukrainian intellectuals founded a popular educational society in Lviv in 1868. The organization, called "Prosvita" (Enlightenment), was the Galician Ukrainian equivalent of the numerous *matice* or cultural-educational societies that played such a key role in fostering east European national movements. Prosvita published and distributed inexpensive booklets for the peasantry and aimed at establishing a network of village reading clubs. For the dissemination of its popular booklets, Prosvita in 1875-77 had ninety-one distribution agents in seventy-five localities: forty of these agents were priests, nine were associations (in which the parish priest probably played a major role) and twenty-four were merchants and booksellers (thus concentrated in the cities, not in the villages). Similarly, Prosvita's Russophile rival, the Kachkovs'kyi Society, had forty-six agents in 1876, twenty-two of whom were priests and twenty-four of which were associations (again, most probably led by the pastor).¹³ While intellectuals could write and publish booklets in Lviv, it clearly required the services of clergymen to put the booklets in the hands of peasants. This is confirmed by an analysis of the cumulative membership of Prosvita for the years 1868-74. Excluding peasants, the clergy accounted for 65 per cent of all Prosvita's members in the countryside. Prosvita's secular intelligentsia, however, was overwhelmingly concentrated in the cities (80 per cent), especially in Lviv (35 per cent), but also in other cities both within (31 per cent) and outside Galicia (14 per cent).¹⁴

Thanks to the pastors' activities, a host of new institutions began in the 1870s to supplement the traditional village institutions of church and tavern: temperance societies, church brotherhoods, reading clubs, coöperative stores, communal granaries, loan funds, schools, choirs,

Movement in Galicia (The 1870s)," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, vol. II, no. 2 (June 1978; forthcoming).

12. The Russian Ukrainian Mykhailo Drahomanov was the author of the 1889 national populist program that appeared as the editors' programmatic statement in the Lviv journal *Pravda*. Home-grown Galician national populists, however, were responsible for making the reservation about laicization. Mykhailo Drahomanov, "Chudats'ki dumky pro ukrains'ku natsional'nu spravu," *Vybrani tvory* (Prague, 1937), p. 313.

13. Mykhailo Pavlyk, "Pro rus'ko-ukrains'ki narodni chytal'ni," *Tvory* (Kiev, 1959), p. 534.

14. "Chlenny tovarystva "Prosvita,"" *Spravozdanie z dilani "Prosvity" vid chasu zaviazannia . . . 1868 roku, do najnoviishoho chasu* (Lviv, 1874), pp. 26-32.

amateur theatrical troupes, gymnastic clubs and volunteer fire brigades. The press (and the urban intelligentsia behind it) forged these new institutions into links connecting the isolated rural committees to the wider community of the *nation*.¹⁵

The literary starting point for the transformation of the Ukrainian village was Father Stepan Kachala's brochure of 1869, *Shcho nas hubyt' a shcho nam pomochy mozhe* (What is Destroying Us and What Can Help Us). This brochure, which proceeded from theological, not socioeconomic principles, traced the origin of the Ukrainian peasant's poverty to sloth, drunkenness and prodigality and prescribed the antidotes of hard work, temperance and thrift in order to achieve prosperity. It was written in simple language in the form of a conversation between a pastor and his parishioners. A sample:

Pavlo: It's strange how things happen. So long as the people were still performing compulsory labour [i.e., under serfdom], so long as — as they say — times were bad, the peasants' plots of land were clean [i.e., unmortgaged]. Today there's emancipation, but even if a father does manage to leave his children some little piece of land, that little piece is sure to be in mortgage. And why? Mainly because lack of sense and drunkenness. . . .

Vasyl': It's sad everywhere you look, but could it not be otherwise?

Priest: It could be, but there's little hope. It's all the fault of whiskey.¹⁶

Father Kachala's practical advice was more perceptive than his analysis of what caused the decline of peasant small holdings. He recommended that the peasants arrange public readings on Sunday and holidays instead of sitting in the tavern. He also urged the peasants to found schools, communal granaries and loan funds.

The ideas propagated in Kachala's booklet made a great impression, especially in the ranks of the clergy. Soon after Prosvita published the brochure, the newly appointed Greek Catholic Metropolitan, Iosyf Sembratovych, wrote to Rome about initiating a large-scale temperance campaign. As a consequence of this correspondence, Sembratovych issued a pastoral letter stating that the Roman Pontiff would grant a hundred or more days' indulgence to everyone who joined a temperance society, while priests who set up a temperance society could expect to earn double the number of days' indulgence. Energetic priests in Stanyslaviv, with the Metropolitan's support, set up an apostolic mission to rid the Ukrainian countryside of drunkenness.¹⁷

15. This process of "social reorganization" has been described in reference to the Polish village in William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 2 vols., Dover reprint of 2nd ed. (New York, 1958), II, 1303-1463.

16. [Stepan Kachala], *Shcho nas hubyt' a shcho nam pomochy mozhe. Pys'mo dlia rus'kykh selian* (Lviv, 1869), p. 28.

17. [Volodymyr Navrots'kyi], "Pis'mo iz Galitsii," *Kievskii telegraf*, 9 March 1875, p. 1.

The apostles of sobriety carried their crusade from village to village. They would give advance notice to pastors before descending upon parishes during the holidays. Local pastors would announce the sobriety mission to their parishioners and these, together with their neighbours from other parishes and villages, would gather on the appointed day. As many as six thousand peasants would come, bearing icons, crosses and church banners, to hear the apostles of sobriety. In the village of the mission, the apostles and local pastors would concelebrate the Liturgy and afterwards the apostles would preach outdoors to the assembled multitude. "The people," wrote an observer of these missions, "for the most part weep during the sermon."¹⁸ Following the sermon, a "Golden Book" was produced, in which the names of those who wished to join the temperance society were inscribed. Then the whole throng would carry a large cross in procession to the crossroads or to some other conspicuous place and erect it. The cross would bear an inscription such as "The cross, having vanquished paganism, shall also vanquish drunkenness" or "The commune of such-and-such a village, in memory of its sobering." Following the erection of the cross, the temperance missionaries would preach again, inviting the throng of peasants to vow to abstain from drink. Such impressive spectacles took place even in the winter during snowstorms.

The missions appealed to the peasants' emotions and won many converts to abstinence. But emotions are ephemeral, and so too was abstinence. For instance, four years after the village of Stynava Vyzhnia pledged abstinence, no trace of the pledge remained. A popular newspaper reported: "Whoever did not drink before the introduction of sobriety does not drink even now, and whoever drank then drinks also now."¹⁹

A more lasting effect of the crusade for abstinence was that it paved the way for village reading clubs. Many parishes established confraternities of sobriety which frequently evolved into reading clubs.²⁰ Many priests took the advice of Father Kachala and arranged public readings on Sundays and holidays specifically to lure their parishioners away from diversion in their tavern.²¹

The pastor, then, was quite often the moving spirit behind the establishment of reading clubs in the village. Priests, too, such as the national populist Kachala and the Russophile Ivan Naumovych, were

On Iosyf Sembratovych and the sobriety campaign, see also Irynei I. Nazarko, *Kyivs'ki i halyts'ki mytropolyty. Biografichni narysy (1590-1960)* (Rome, 1962), pp. 200-201.

18. [Navrots'kyi], *Kievskii telegraf*, 9 March 1875, p. 1.

19. "Z Stryishchyny," *Bat'kivshchyna*, 4 April 1890, p. 181.

20. Pavlyk, pp. 518, 522-23.

21. See, for example, Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi istorychnyi arkhiv URSR u L'vovi [TsDIAL], 663/1/110, pp. 178-79. Cf. Oleksii Zaklyns'kyi, *Zapysky parokha Starykh Bohorodchan* (2nd ed.; Toronto, 1960), p. 99.

often involved in the reading-club movement in the wider sense, propagating the doctrine of reading clubs through the press and through all-Galician institutions like Prosvita or the Kachkovs'kyi Society. But the real significance of the reading clubs had less to do with the clergy than with the secular intelligentsia: reading clubs linked the peasantry with the urban intelligentsia.

The parliamentary elections of 1879 — in which only three “enlightened Ruthenians” (i.e., Ukrainians) were elected — spurred the national populist intelligentsia to more intense activity. They founded a popular newspaper, *Bat'kivshchyna* (Patrimony), written for the peasants and highly political.²² With an organization like Prosvita, a newspaper like *Bat'kivshchyna* and the support of some of the clergy, the national populists set to work transforming the villages from the capital.

At the village level, the main instrument of transformation was the reading club. Only a pair of reading clubs figured in the membership list of Prosvita between 1868 and 1874.²³ By 1886, however, the Vice-royalty reported 461 Ukrainian reading clubs in Galicia.²⁴ By 1908, Prosvita alone was the patron of 2,048 Galician reading clubs.²⁵ These clubs, generally with about fifty members,²⁶ gathered on Sundays and holidays for public readings. Thus, although statistics show that in 1890 well over three-quarters of the Ukrainian peasants were completely illiterate,²⁷ a kind of ersatz-literacy was being introduced into the Ukrainian village thanks to these public readings by literate individuals. But more than literacy was involved. Joining an organization to listen to or read newspapers and booklets gave the Ukrainian peasant membership in a community wider than the village commune, a community that included other peasants in other villages as well as editors and writers in the capital. In short, by joining reading clubs, peasants joined the nation. And the nation itself grew, was formed, by this expanding infrastructure of village institutions.

22. On the origins of *Bat'kivshchyna*, see Pavlyk, p. 45.

23. “Chlenny tovarystva ‘Prosvita,’ ” *Spravozdanie*, pp. 26-32.

24. *Rocznik statystyki Galicyi*, III (1891), 130. Some of these were associated exclusively with the Russophile Kachkovs'kyi Society, not with Prosvita.

25. Mykhailo Lozyns'kyi, *Sorok lit diial'nosti “Pros'vity”* (Lviv, 1908), pp. 46-47.

26. Mykhailo, “Spravy ruskykh chytalen’,” *Bat'kivshchyna*, 21 November 1884, p. 295. The information in this article was taken from statistical and descriptive data collected by a Ukrainian student club. A check of seven reading clubs in *Bat'kivshchyna*, 1890, confirms that their average membership was fifty-two.

27. *Österreichische Statistik*, XXXII, no. 1 (1892), 125. This figure excludes Lviv and Cracow. Considering that most of the literate outside these two cities would be concentrated in the other Galician cities and towns, that Polish-inhabited western Galicia had a better developed primary educational system than Ukrainian-inhabited eastern Galicia, and that in the countryside non-peasant classes (nobles, stewards, tavern keepers, priests, teachers) made up a great part of the rural literate, to estimate that nine out of ten Ukrainian peasants could neither read nor write may err on the side of understating their illiteracy.

The reading clubs met regularly on Sundays and holidays, sometimes in buildings specifically designated for this purpose (often housing coöperative stores as well), sometimes in private homes, school buildings,²⁸ or even cemeteries.²⁹ Every parish contained a potential reading club. Since the village clergy played an important part in initiating the clubs, often in connection with the temperance movement, it is not surprising that priests were sometimes elected to preside over the clubs.³⁰ According to Rev. Isydor Sokhots'kyi, a Greek Catholic priest writing in 1951, the Greek Catholic clergy "established the majority of reading clubs and led them."³¹ If Father Sokhots'kyi exaggerates a little, he nonetheless is correct to underscore the important role of the priest in bringing reading clubs to the villages, and in serving as the crucial mediator between the urban intelligentsia and the peasantry.³²

The priest's mediation, however, became obsolete at the moment when institutions and the press connected the village more directly and more effectively to the wider community of the nation. The priest's historical mission in the village — to put this in grand nineteenth-century terms — was to replace himself with institutions. In other words, the priest was important in the very first phase of the villages' transformation, in the initial germination of the movement to found institutions and read newspapers; but once the movement in a village passed this primary stage and began to run on its own momentum, the priest became an expendable part of the process and very often, in fact, an opponent of the educational movement.

The clergy did not awaken to its own expendability all at once. The reading clubs penetrated individual villages at different times, so that while Denysiv might be in its primary phase in the 1870s, Khlivchany might not get there until the 1900s. So it is difficult to pinpoint a moment in history when the clergy as a whole realized the danger of the reading club. Still, if forced to choose such a moment, one might settle upon the late 1890s, when the Basilian Fathers established the magazine *Misionar'* (The Missionary) to combat the pervasive influence of radically secular periodicals.³³ In 1899, the Lviv Metropolitan, Iulian Sas-Kuilovs'kyi,

28. See, for example, *Bat'kivshchyna*, 1890, pp. 85 and 194.

29. *TsDIAL*, 663/1/110, p. 179.

30. *Bat'kivshchyna*, 1890, p. 117.

31. Sokhots'kyi, p. 65.

32. "Perhaps the most important role the clergy played in all lands under investigation was mediator between the peasant masses and the surrounding world. The clergy long into the capitalist era, especially in poorer agrarian regions, was the most important connecting link that controlled the route by which the peasants obtained news of the world and, conversely, by which this 'world' received information about the rural population." Hroch, p. 131.

33. "Misliia protiv 'Misionaria,'" *Hromads'kyi holos*, 1899, no. 7, pp. 54-55.

issued his circular on reading clubs: "Instead of confirming in the nation the doctrine of the holy Gospel and the holy Church, [pastors] have found reading clubs, which bring more spiritual harm than benefit. Instead of national love, they have awakened in our peasant self-love and arrogance."³⁴

Clerical opposition to the development of reading clubs can also be found before 1899. Sometimes this is even reflected in articles written by peasants and published in the national populist press³⁵ (although it is reasonable to suspect that national populist editors would normally choose not to print material showing the clergy in a bad light). There were two broad categories of discord between priest and reading clubs: intellectual and economic.

Before the coming of the reading club, the priest had a monopoly on education in the Ukrainian community in the countryside. The priest was also the interpreter of the only ideology known to the Ukrainian peasants — Greek Catholicism. But with participation in the national movement, the peasants came to understand that there were also secular ideologies and secular knowledge. In fact, as Miroslav Hroch has noticed: "A precondition for national activation in the case of the peasantry was not only its emancipation, but also a certain level of education that first allowed it to understand the connections between its own interests and an ideology that was *extra-religious*."³⁶ The acquisition of secular knowledge by the peasantry generally involved some limitation on the authority of the priest. Intellectual peasants began to think independently and to question the previously unquestioned moral and intellectual authority of the pastor. In short, as Metropolitan Kuilovs'kyi put it, the peasants developed "arrogance." This intellectual arrogance often came to the fore over issues of morality. What right had the clergy to forbid them to "settle on faith," i.e., live together without marriage?³⁷ What right had the clergy to forbid them to drink?

In the parish of Monastyrsk, for example, a booklet of the temperance society was found in 1876 with inscriptions attacking the sobriety campaign:

Eh. You shouldn't try to befuddle people with this piece of paper. We, though simple people, know this isn't from God but is a contrivance priests use to dupe the people. Even though we've taken the oath, we

34. Quoted in "Mytropolyt Kuilovs'kyi pro rus'ke dukhovenstvo," *ibid.*, 1899, no. 22, p. 182.

35. See, for example: Parokhiianc z Romanova, "Prosvitytel' naroda," *Bat'kivshchyna*, 7 February 1890, p. 69; "Radist' i neradist'!" *Bat'kivshchyna*, 28 March 1890, p. 165.

36. Hroch, p. 106 (emphasis added).

37. Ivan Franko [M-on], "Pis'ma iz Avstriiskoi Ukrainy," *Vol'noe slovo*, 1 February 1883, p. 4.

drink, because we know who invented sobriety: learned people who don't know anything themselves. The Metropolitan himself in Lviv, although they say he's learned, obviously knows very little or he would have contrived something better than [the sobriety movement]. . . . People! Don't believe these words: learned people drink more than we unlearned people and we don't yell at them that they're drunks.³⁸

At the end of the booklet were curses and threats against those active in the sobriety campaign.

The other sphere of conflict between clergyman and rustic was economic. Florian Znaniecki and William Thomas, referring to the somewhat different Polish situation, described the potential for economic antagonism between a pastor and his flock:

There is no inveterate class antagonism preventing collaboration [between priest and peasant], for the priest, as long as he is considered as an essentially religious personality, is in a sense outside of the class system; only when the worldly attributes of the priest begin to predominate in the eyes of the peasant over his sacral character, reflections are made concerning his class connections. There is a certain mistrust resulting from the often exaggerated economic demands of the priest. . . .³⁹

Especially in the Ukrainian situation an economic antagonism existed, because the married Greek Catholic clergy was more of an economic burden on the village than was the celibate Roman Catholic clergy.

The Greek Catholic priest generally had three sources of income: a salary from the government, a sizable farm of 12.5 to 50 hectares,⁴⁰ and fees for sacramental rites. Even the pastor of a poor parish of eighty households could make more than his salary of 380 gulden on the fees from burials alone.⁴¹ And peasants not only died, but married, gave birth and had bad luck, so the priest earned fees from weddings, christenings and prayer services as well. It was in the priest's interest to keep sacramental fees high; his salary might only pay for one son's education, and, of course, it was necessary to put away something for his daughters' dowries, to buy the right clothing for his wife to wear in society, to buy or repair a carriage, to

38. The inscriptions probably came from the pen of Anna Pavlyk. "Sotsialisty," *Slovo*, 26 January 1878, p. 3.

39. Thomas and Znaniecki, II, 1310.

40. Ivan Franko, "Zemel'na vlasnist' u Halychyni," *Tvory*, 20 vols. (Kiev, 1950-56), XIX, 284.

41. See the budget of a priest published by Ivan Franko in *Malot* in 1878, "Dodatky i vydatky vbohooho sviashchenyuka," reprinted in M.F. Nechytaliuk, *Publitsystyka Ivana Franka (1875-1886 rr.)*. *Seminarii* (Lviv, 1972), pp. 60-65.

make some improvement on his farm, and so on. It was in the peasant's interest, however, to keep these fees low, since he was finding it difficult enough to survive taxes, loan repayments and other unpleasant burdens of the money economy. Sacramental fees, however, constituted only one source of economic antagonism. Another problem was that the priest, in the course of farming his large holdings, often became involved in disputes over gleaning and pasture rights.⁴² A third source of economic friction was that the Roman and Greek Catholic churches owned 53,250 hectares of manorial estates in Galicia, including 32,000 hectares of forest.⁴³ Thus village communes involved in legal suits over forest rights might well have the Church for their adversary, engendering profound anti-clerical sentiments.⁴⁴

The reading club frequently became the forum for peasant interests and evolved into an anti-clerical institution. There was the case, for instance, of the two neighbouring villages of Dobrivliany and Volia Iakubova. In both villages reading clubs appeared in the early 1880s. The pastors at first supported the reading clubs, purchasing periodical subscriptions for the clubs, attending club meetings and encouraging their children to attend. But in both villages, serious disputes broke out over ideology and over economic matters — particularly over the issue of sacramental fees. By the mid-1880s, the reading clubs were engaging in blasphemous and anti-clerical agitation and the pastors denounced their parishioners to the police. The leaders of the reading clubs were imprisoned.⁴⁵

Such incidents became by the 1890s a recurring feature of the Galician social landscape.⁴⁶ In 1890, young intellectuals in Lviv founded a vehemently anti-clerical political party, the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party. The radical intellectuals encouraged confrontation in the villages between pastors and reading clubs and published anti-clerical brochures and periodicals for peasant consumption. The irony of the radicals' position was that, in seeking to liberate the Ukrainian movement from clerical influence, they had to wait until the village clergy had prepared the

42. Letter of Ivan Maksymiak to Ivan Franko, 30 October 1883, in Instytut literatury Akademii nauk URSS, Viddil rukopysiv, f. 3, od. zb. 1603, pp. 43-44. [Panas Mel'nyk] "Pys'mo z pid Drohobychla," *Bat'kivshchyna*, 1 August 1884, p. 194.

43. Tadeusz Pilat, *O stosunkach własności tabularnej w Galicyi* (Lviv, 1888), p. 5.

44. Such was the case in the village of Lodyn. Franko, *Vol'noe slovo*, 1 February 1883, p. 4.

45. For an introduction to this complex story, see Bezstoronnyi [V. Nahirnyi?], "Pys'mo z Drohobys'koho," *Bat'kivshchyna*, 1886, no. 36-37, pp. 214-15, no. 38, pp. 223-24; and E.L. Solecki [El.], "Wojna o 'jura stolae,'" *Gazeta Nadniestrzańska*, 15 June 1886, pp. 2-3. Cf. Petro Berehuliak and Semen Vityk in O.I. Dei (ed.), *Ivan Franko u spohadakh suchasnykh*. *Knyha druha* (Lviv, 1972).

46. One has only to leaf through the issues of the radical newspapers *Narod*, *Khliborob* and *Hromads'kyi holos* to appreciate how widespread and, on occasion, violent was this

way for anti-clerical agitation by endowing the peasants with institutions and raising their educational level. In 1899, the Radical Party split three ways, giving birth to the triumvirate that dominated west Ukrainian politics into the 1930s: the radical, social democratic and national democratic parties. Two of these parties were profoundly anti-clerical while the third, the National Democratic Party, although admitting the clergy to a share in national politics, never allowed it to hold the authority and influence it had once enjoyed in the national movement.⁴⁷

The decisive factor determining the priest's place in the national movement was his relation to the peasant. Urban intellectuals, in the early phases of the popular national movement, depended on the clergy to act as a bridge connecting them with the peasantry. This was the most significant source of the clergy's influence in the national movement. The priest-peasant relationship was also crucial, however, in the loss of the clergy's influence. Economic and intellectual antagonism between priest and peasant grew more acute as the very process of nation-building gave the peasant new institutional and intellectual resources. The new peasant resources, to a great extent engendered by the clergy itself, permitted the intelligentsia to by-pass the hitherto indispensable village clergy and to enter into direct contact with the peasantry.

In conclusion, a few words are in order about the limits of validity of this model beyond the context of Ukrainian Galicia. The model assumes that the clergy is educated enough to be a useful and compatible partner for the intelligentsia in the early phases of the national movement. While

conflict between pastors and radicalized reading clubs. In Morozovychi (Sambir district), the reading club celebrated the pastor's name day — to commemorate the villagers' "liberation from the inquisitorial enslavement to Rev. Nikolai Bobers'kyi." One radical peasant complained that a partisan of Father Bobers'kyi "made an anarchistic attempt on my life with an iron bar across my head" ("Vicha v seli Morozovychakh," *Hromads'kyi holos*, 1899, no. 3, pp. 19-20). Priests regularly attacked peasant radicals from the pulpit (*ibid.*, 1899, pp. 23, 65-66, 101, 129, 150, 153, 178; 1900, p. 13) and occasionally in the confessional (*ibid.*, 1899, p. 152) and in the schools (*ibid.*, 1900, p. 91). Priests at times withheld burial from radical parishioners, but the radicals would retaliate by arranging their own burial services ("Iak pokhovaly my tovarysha Antona Hrytsuniaka," *ibid.*, 1900, no. 9, pp. 77-79; see also *ibid.*, 1900, p. 4). The village reading club was the focus of many conflicts. Most frequently the clergy tried to ban radical papers from the clubs and to supplant them with *Misionar*. In other cases, the pastors would wrest control of the club from the peasant leaders and see to it that the club ceased its activity (*ibid.*, 1899, pp. 32-33, 57-58; 1900, p. 135). Other priests opposed the clubs without subterfuge and tried to close them down outright (*ibid.*, 1899, pp. 140, 152). Admittedly, *Hromads'kyi holos* and the other radical papers were biased, but their village reporting was contributed by the peasants themselves; hence these papers' reports reflect authentic peasant attitudes, however subjective.

47. One symptom of the decline of clerical influence can be found in the social composition of the Galician Ukrainian parliamentary delegations. In the 1860s and 1870s, the clergy dominated these delegations, by the 1900s — the secular intelligentsia. Of twenty-eight Ukrainian deputies in the 1909-11 session of Parliament, only four were clerics. *Index zu den stenographischen Protokollen des Hauses der Abgeordneten des Reichsrates* (Vienna, 1911).

this was certainly true of the Greek Catholic clergy, which was educated, for the most part, at universities in Lviv and Vienna, it was not true of the majority of Orthodox clerics in eastern Europe. The model also assumes that the clergy has not been denationalized, as was the case of the Ukrainian clergy in Russia. Certainly, too, the role of the priest would not be so pivotal in ethnic groups that had a well-developed village school system with conational teachers. This was not the case in nineteenth-century Ukrainian Galicia. Moreover, the validity of the potential antagonism between priest and peasant depends on the social and economic position of the religious leader in the community. Finally, it should be noted that the model is most suited to the sociologically simple societies of eastern Europe, those of the so-called non-historic or plebian peoples. More complex societies, such as that of the Poles in Galicia, may have another traditional élite — the nobility — that takes precedence over the clergy. They may also have a potential urban constituency for the national movement in the merchants, artisans and workers of the same ethnic group. The existence of an urban constituency would allow the urban intelligentsia to obviate the problem of reaching the villages and the attendant dependence on the clergy.

